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Harshit Bisht1[0000−0003−4785−4989] and Amit Kuber1[0000−0003−4812−1234]
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Abstract. We generalize the Arrow’s impossibility theorem–a key result
in social choice theory–to the setting where the arity k of the relation
under consideration is greater than 2. Some special but natural properties
of k-ary relations are considered, as well as an analogue for such k-ary
relations of Endriss and Grandi’s result on graph aggregation is proved.
Keywords: Social choice · Arrow’s impossibility theorem · Aggregation
of structures.
1 Introduction
With the seminal result in [1], Arrow introduced the problem of aggregating
voters’ preferences into a collective preference ordering over a set of alternatives
(candidates) and showed that such an aggregation must be dictatorial to satisfy
seemingly reasonable constraints, laying the foundations for social choice theory.
The result has been proved in multiple different settings ([2],[3]), and general-
ized to partially ordered preferences and graphs in [3] and [4] respectively. As
computational tools make it easy to survey and assess data, summarisation and
aggregation tools will be required to make inferences or decisions based on the
observed relationships such as planning city routes given access to graphs cor-
responding to each pedestrian’s activity. However, not all relationships can be
adequately represented in the form of binary relations such as partial orders and
graphs. Consider the relationship of “knowing” someone on a social network in-
ferred from being tagged in the same picture, a group of three friends in the
same photo carries more information than all combinations of pairs and can be
best expressed by a 2-simplex. With the motivation of extending the problem to
account for such complex relationships, we generalize the impossibility result to
aggregating relational structures of any arity satisfying some special properties.
2 Aggregating k-ary Relations
Fix a non-empty finite set A of candidates. Consider the predicate language
LA := {R, {ca | a ∈ A}} (for simplicity, we have assumed that LA contains
a single relation symbol R), where R is a k-ary relation symbol with k ≥ 3
and each ca is a constant symbol. Let T0 consist of a single LA-sentence whose
interpretation guarantees that each LA-structure has domain (in bijection with)
A. We will deal with models of some LA-theory T extending T0; the extension
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T will be specified in the due course. When the theory T is fixed, in order to
emphasize on the set A, we denote the collection of models of the theory T by
M(A).
A social choice situation over LA consists of the following. Let I denote a
set of voters/individuals. Each voter chooses Ai ∈ M(A). An aggregation rule
(also known as a social welfare function) is a map σ : D ⊆ M(A)I → M(A)
that satisfies some desirable properties, where D is the set of allowed ballots or
profiles. By appropriately choosing T and the properties of the aggregation rule,
we will prove that the only legitimate choice of the aggregated structure is either
a filtered product or an ultraproduct of {Mi}i∈I ; the latter case corresponds to
a “dictatorship” when I is finite.
2.1 Properties of k-ary relations
Since Arrow’s original result speaks of preference relations, it seemed natural to
first attempt to extend it over relations. Owing at the lack of standard definitions
of properties for k-ary relations, we attempt to provide our own and arrive at
the result. We begin by setting up some notations.
– (a1, ..., am)
+i1,...,+in,−j1,...,−jw
δr refers to the set of subsequences of (a1, ..., am)
of length m − r, with elements ai1 , ..., ain necessarily present and elements
aj1 , ..., ajw necessarily absent.
– a¯−j , b refers to the singleton element in (a1, ..., aj , b, aj+1, ..., ak)
−j
δ .
Over a set A, a k-ary relation R is simply a subset of A× ...×A (k-times) or
Ak. Now we define some desirable properties of k-ary relations that will make
up the extended theory T .
Definition 1. A k-ary relation R is called connected if, for each pairwise-
distinct a1, ..., ak ∈ A, there is a permutation τ of {1, ..., k} such that (a1, ..., ak)τ
is in R.
Definition 2. A k-ary relation R is called simplicial transitive if for each
(k+1)-ary sequence of pairwise-distinct elements (a1, ..., ak, ak+1), we have that
(a1, ..., ak+1)
+j
δ ⊆ R implies (a1, ..., ak+1)
−j
δ ⊆ R for each j ∈ {1, ..., k + 1}.
Definition 3. A k-ary relation R is called path transitive if for k-ary se-
quences of pairwise-distinct elements (a1, ..., ak) and (b1, ..., bk) with ai = bj
where i > j, we have that (a1, ..., ak) ∈ R and (b1, ..., bk) ∈ R implies that
(a1, ..., ai−1, bj+1, ..., bk)δi−j−1 ⊆ R.
Definition 4. A k-ary relation R is called exclusive if R[a¯τ ] does not hold for
all permutations τ of 1, ..., k together.
2.2 Examples
Several natural relationships are not adequately captured by binary relations.
The following two examples satisfy the above defined properties and present
natural aggregation scenarios where our result asserts that a desirable collective
relation is impossible to produce.
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Moderate Voters Consider a collection of voters and a group of electoral
candidates. Each voter interprets the political inclination of each candidate as
left or right leaning compared to the others resulting in a total order over the
set of candidates. If each voter prefers the moderate candidate in a group of
3 candidates, then this voting behaviour can be captured by a “betweenness”
relation, with (a, b, c) ∈ Ri ↔ (c, b, a) ∈ Ri representing the ith voters preference
for b over a and c. Clearly, relations of this nature are both connected and
exclusive. This relation is also simplicial transitive since for a sequence a1, ..., a4
of candidates, specifying the betweenness of 3 restricted triples is enough to
guarantee a1, ..., a4 as strictly monotonous.
Seating along a circular table Consider a party of dinner guests to be seated
on circular table in groups of 4 (any cyclic arrangement is fine) and preferences
over how every subsets of 4 people should be seated. This quartenary relation
R on the party of dinner guests is such that if (a, b, c, d) ∈ R then all cyclic
permutations (b, c, d, a), (c, d, a, b), (d, a, b, c) ∈ R and no other permutation of
{a, b, c, d} is in R. Again, this is both connected and exclusive. Now, consider the
same voter’s preferences over seating 5 people on the same table. If he agrees on
the cyclic permutation of every collection of 4 people but one, he will also agree
to the final restriction of the original 5-cycle. This is the definition of simplicial
transitivity considered above. Thus, preferences on the seating of people around
circular tables thus also satisfies the properties defined above.
Our main result implies that both these situations cannot be aggregated with
certain desirable properties of the aggregation map.
2.3 Properties of the aggregation map
We considered some properties of k-ary relations above. Now we state the appro-
priate k-ary generalizations of the properties of the aggregation map that make
the proof of the Arrow’s impossibility theorem work.
(UD) ∀a1, ..., ak+1 ∈ A.∀p ∈M({a1, ..., ak+1})I .∃q ∈ D.q|a1,...,ak = p
Normally one expects the aggregation map to be defined on all I-tuples of T -
models, but the property UD generalizes the result by requiring the domain
D to only be large enough for the proof to go through.
(P) ∀a¯ ∈ Ak.∀p ∈ D.(∀i ∈ I.pi |= R[a¯])⇒ σ(p) |= R[a¯]
P requires that the result must satisfy the atomic formulas satisfied by each
individual voter.
(IIA) ∀a¯ ∈ Ak.∀p, q ∈ D.(∀i ∈ I.pi |= R[a¯] ⇔ qi |= R[a¯]) ⇒ (σ(p) |= R[a¯] ⇔
σ(q) |= R[a¯])
IIA requires each atomic formula’s satisfaction to be independent of other
formulas.
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(D) ∃i ∈ I.∀a¯ ∈ Ak.∀p ∈ D.(pi |= R[a¯]⇔ σ(p) |= R[a¯])
D posits that the result satisfies the same atomic formulas as one specific
voter.
2.4 Arrow’s theorem for a single k-ary relation
Now we are ready to state and prove the generalization of Arrow’s theorem to the
situation for a single k-ary relation symbol. We deal with two sets of properties
of k-ary relations, and prove the theorem in both cases parallelly.
Theorem 1. Let (A, I,D, σ) be a social choice situation over k-ary relation R
language L with |A| ≥ k + 1, satisfying UD,P, and IIA where R is (simplicial
or path) transitive, exclusive, and connected. Then for finite I, it also satisfies
D.
We prove this theorem in a series of propositions along the lines of [5]. First we
introduce some notation. For any U ⊆ I, define Ua¯ := {p ∈ D|pU |= R[a¯]∧pUc 6|=
R[a¯]}. Define a new k-ary relation DU on A by DU [a¯] := distinct(a¯) ∧ ∀p ∈
Ua¯.σ(p) |= R[a¯], where distinct(a¯) is short for
∧
1≤i<j≤k ai 6= aj .
Proposition 1. For any tuple of pairwise distinct elements a¯, DU [a¯]⇒ DU [a¯−j, b]
for each j ∈ {1, ..., k}.
Proof. If aj = b, there is nothing to prove and we are done.
If R is simplicial transitive:
For aj 6= b, we construct a profile p with a¯, (a¯
−j , b), and (a1, ..., aj, b, ..., ak)
j,j+1
δ
holding (or not) at U and U c according to the following table. The p as con-
structed can be posited to exist due to UD.
a¯ a¯−j , b (a1, ..., aj , b, ..., ak)
j,j+1
δ
U ✓ ✓ ✓
U c ✗ ✗ ✓
Clearly, p ∈ Ua¯ ∩ Ua¯−j ,b, along with p ∈ Ic¯ for each c¯ ∈ (a1, ..., aj , b, ..., ak)
j,j+1
δ .
Thus, σ(p) |= R[a¯] (definition ofDU ) and σ(p) |= R[c¯] for each c¯ ∈ (a1, ..., aj , b, ..., ak)
j,j+1
δ
(P). By transitivity, we can now conclude σ(p) |= R[a¯−j , b].
Now, for any other profile q ∈ Ua¯−j ,b, we know that ∀i ∈ I.pi |= R[a¯
−j, b]⇔
qi |= R[a¯−j , b], making us conclude σ(q) |= R[a¯−j, b] (IIA) and thus that
DU [a¯
−j , b] holds.
If R is path transitive:
For aj 6= b, we construct a profile p with various combinations of a1, ..., ak, b hold-
ing (or not) at U and U c according to the following table. The p as constructed
can be posited to exist due to UD.
a¯ a¯−j , b (a2, ..., aj , b, ..., ak)
U ✓ ✓ ✓
U c ✗ ✗ ✓
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Clearly, p ∈ Ua¯ ∩ Ua¯−j ,b, along with p ∈ Ic¯ for c¯ = (a2, ..., aj , b, ..., ak). Thus,
σ(p) |= R[a¯] (definition of DU ) and σ(p) |= R[c¯] for c¯(a2, ..., aj , b, ..., ak) (P).
By transitivity, we can now conclude σ(p) |= a¯−j , b. Now, for any other profile
q ∈ Ua¯−j ,b, we know that ∀i ∈ I.pi |= R[a¯
−j , b] ⇔ qi |= R[a¯−j , b], making us
conclude σ(q) |= R[a¯−j , b] (IIA) and thus that DU [a¯−j , b] holds.
Note that this proof does not work for j = 1. For that, the same proof with
(b, a1, ..., ak−1) (reversing position of aj and b) works.
Proposition 2. For any k-tuples of pairwise distinct elements a¯ and b¯, DU [a¯]⇒
DU [b¯].
Proof. We will work through the proof in two cases.
Case 1: Let b¯ have the same elements as a¯, only in a different permutation.
Since |A| ≥ k + 1, we can get hold of c ∈ A which is distinct from all elements
in a¯ (or b¯). Consider the following inductive procedure:
Algorithm 1: Concluding DU [b¯] from DU [a¯]
1 Beginning from D[a¯]
2 Identify am such that b1 = am
3 Conclude DU [a¯
−m, c] (by proposition 2)
4 Conclude DU [(a¯
−m, c)−1, b1] (by proposition 2)
5 Conclude DU [((a¯
−m, c)−1, b1)
−m, a1] (by proposition 2)
6 You have now shown DU holds for a permutation agreeing with a¯ on the
first element
7 Repeat similarly for b2, b3, ..., bk
Case 2: Let b¯ contain c1, ..., cn and a¯ contain d1, ..., dn as the elements not
shared between them. Conclude that DU holds at a sequence with each di in
a¯ replaced arbitrarily by ci’s using proposition 2. What is obtained now is a
permutation of b¯, allowing the conclusion to hold as shown in Case 1.
The way we defined DU [a¯] talks only about preference profiles where only the
individuals in U support a¯. Intuitively, it is clear that profiles where even more
individuals support a¯ should also guarantee it to hold in the result. This is
captured by the relation
EU [a¯] := distinct(a¯) ∧ ∀p ∈ D.(pU |= R[a¯]⇒ σ(p) |= R[a¯])
.
Proposition 3. For any tuple of pairwise distinct elements a¯, DU [a¯]⇔ EU [a¯].
Proof. EU [a¯] ⇒ DU [a¯] is clear from the definitions. We will thus focus on the
proof of DU [a¯]⇒ EU [a¯].
If R is simplicial transitive:
Consider a profile p, not necessarily in Ua¯ such that pU |= R[a¯]. We construct a
profile q with a¯, (b, a2, a3, ..., ak), and (a1, b, a2, ..., ak)
1,2
δ holding (or not) at U
and U c according to the following table. The q as constructed can be posited to
exist due to UD.
6 H. Bisht, A.S. Kuber
a¯ b, a2, ..., ak (a1, b, a2, ..., ak)
1,2
δ
U ✓ ✓ ✓
U c mimics p ✓ ✗
Clearly, q ∈ Uc¯ for each c¯ ∈ (a1, b, a2, ..., ak)
1,2
δ , along with q ∈ Ib,a2,...,ak . Thus,
σ(q) |= R[b, a2, ..., ak] (P) and σ(q) |= R[c¯] for each c¯ ∈ (a1, b, a2, ..., ak)
1,2
δ (DU
holds for each such c¯). By transitivity, we can now conclude σ(q) |= R[a¯]. It
is now easy to see that ∀i ∈ I.pi |= R[a¯] ⇔ qi |= R[a¯], making us conclude
σ(p) |= R[a¯] (IIA). Since the initial choice of p was arbitrary, we can conclude
EU [a¯] holds.
If R is path transitive:
Consider a profile p, not necessarily in Ua¯ such that pU |= R[a¯]. We construct a
profile q with a¯, a¯−(k−1), b, and a¯−k, b holding (or not) at U and U c according
to the following table. The q as constructed can be posited to exist due to UD.
a¯ (a1, ..., ak−2, b, ak) (a1, a2, ..., ak−1, b)
U ✓ ✓ ✓
U c mimics p ✗ ✓
Again, q ∈ Uc¯ for c¯ = (a1, ..., ak−2, b, ak), along with q ∈ Ia1,...,ak−1,b. Thus,
σ(q) |= R[a1, ..., ak−1, b] (P) and σ(q) |= R[c¯] for c¯ = (a1, ..., ak−2, b, ak) (DU ).
By transitivity, we can now conclude σ(q) |= R[a¯]. It is now easy to see that
∀i ∈ I.pi |= R[a¯]⇔ qi |= R[a¯], making us conclude σ(p) |= R[a¯] (IIA). Since the
initial choice of p was arbitrary, we can conclude EU [a¯] holds.
Now, consider the following collection of voter coalitions U = {U ⊆ I | ∃a¯ ∈
A.DU [a¯]}. We wish to claim that this collection is an ultrafilter, which will allow
us to find a ”dictator” in the social choice situation, as described above.
Claim. U as defined above is an Ultrafilter.
Proof. (F1: I ∈ U) Because of P, it is easy to note that I ∈ U .
(F2: U is an upper set) Consider U ∈ U and U ⊆ V . Clearly, that gives us
EU ⊆ EV , which allows us to conclude V ∈ U using Proposition 3.
(F3: Any two elements of U intersect) Consider U, V ∈ U such that U ∩ V = φ.
Construct a preference profile p with all possible permutations of a¯ holding (or
not) according to the following table. The p as constructed can be posited to
exist due to UD
a¯ a¯τ( 6=id)
U ✓ ✗
V ✗ ✓
U c ∩ V c ✗ ✗
This would imply that σ(p) |= R[a¯τ ] for each permutation τ (Since U, V ∈ U),
contradicting the exclusivity of R. Thus, such U, V cannot belong in U together.
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(F4: U is a prime filter) Consider U ∈ U such that U = W ⊔ V . We must
show one of W or V also belong in U .
If R is simplicial transitive:
Construct a preference profile p with various permutations of a¯ and a1, ..., ak, b
holding according to the following table:
a¯ a¯τ 6=id (b, a1, a2, ..., ak)
1,2
δ (b, a1, a2, ..., ak)δ (a1, a2, ..., ak, b)δ
V ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗
W ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
U c ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
Since R is connected, some permutation of a¯ must hold at σ(p). We evaluate two
possible cases separately.
Case 1: Let σ(p) |= R[a¯τ ] for some τ 6= id. Clearly here, since p ∈ Va¯τ , we can
conclude that V ∈ U .
Case 2: σ(p) |= R[a¯]. Clearly, p ∈ Uc¯ for each c¯ ∈ (b, a1, ..., ak)
1,2
δ with U ∈ U .
Therefore, σ(p) |= R[c¯] for each c¯ ∈ (b, a1, ..., ak)
1,2
δ . By transitivity, we can con-
clude σ(p) |= R[b, a2, ..., ak]. Since p also belongs to Wb,a2,...,ak , we can conclude
W ∈ U .
If R is path transitive:
Construct a preference profile p with various combinations of a1, ..., ak, b holding
according to the following table:
a¯ a¯τ 6=id (a2, ..., ak, b) (b, a2, ..., ak) (a1, ..., ak−1, b)
V ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗
W ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓
U c ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
Since R is connected, some permutation of a¯ must hold at σ(p). We evaluate two
possible cases separately.
Case 1: Let σ(p) |= R[a¯τ ] for some τ 6= id. Clearly here, since p ∈ Va¯τ , we can
conclude that V ∈ U .
Case 2: σ(p) |= R[a¯]. Clearly, p ∈ Uc¯ for c¯ = (a2, ..., ak, b) with U ∈ U . Therefore,
σ(p) |= R[a2, ..., ak, b]. By transitivity, we can conclude σ(p) |= R[a1, ..., ak−1, b].
Since p also belongs to Wa1,...,ak−1,b, we can conclude W ∈ U .
This leads us to conclude that while aggregating L-structures with single k-
ary relation symbol R, UD, P, IIA, along with connectedness, exclusivity, and
transitivity (any definition) of R are sufficient conditions to conclude U is an
ultrafilter. This is equivalent to the existence of a dictator while aggregating
k-ary relations.
3 Metaproperties for k-ary relations
The above results have been established only for the properties we defined,
restricting their usefulness. Borrowing the ideas put forward in [4], we define
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metaproperties that collect a class of properties and show that an impossibility
result follows for each of them.
3.1 Defining metaproperties
On a fixed set V , we will talk about k-ary relations R ⊆ V k. Since such relations
can be aptly described as uniform directed k-hypergraphs, we interchangeably
call them Uk-graphs, for short. Any property P of k-ary relations can be iden-
tified with the collection of all relations satisfying the property, i.e., a subset P
of P(V k).
The social choice situation has N as the set of individuals, with each i ∈ N
contributing a relation Ri ⊆ V k over a fixed set V . The collection of each voter’s
preference (a preference profile) (Ri)i∈N will be denoted by R. An aggregation
rule F : P(V k)N → P(V k) takes a preference profile R as input and outputs a
collective relation F (R). In profile R, we will use NRa¯ = {i ∈ N | a¯ ∈ Ri} to
denote the collection of voters in N supporting tuple a¯ in R.
Definition 5. The dictatorship of an individual i∗ is the aggregation rule Fi∗
such that for each profile R, Fi∗(R) = Ri∗ .
Definition 6. The oligarchy of a nonempty coalition C∗ is the aggregation
rule FC∗ such that for each profile R, Fi∗(R) =
⋂
i∈C∗ Ri.
We now restate the properties of aggregation rules with slight modifications to
make it easier to work with them. Unanimity means that the aggregated Uk-
graph will contain all tuples included in every voter’s Uk-graph.Groundedness
can be seen as unanimity with respect to abstinence/silence, stating that the re-
sult must contain a tuple only if at least one voter proposes it. Analogous to IIA,
independence of irrelevant edges (IIE) requires that F pays no attention to
the other tuples of the Uk-graphs while making a decision about the inclusion
about a particular tuple. Finally, an aggregation rule being collectively ratio-
nal with respect to a property P implies that its output satisfies P whenever
each relation in the profile does. This is especially useful when the result of the
election must be in the same form as the votes (when aggregating total orders,
for example). The preservation of properties preserve the relational structure of
the inputs.
We wish to define suitable metaproperties that will both allow the proofs to
go through and be general enough to be satisfied by a large class of relations.
We wish for the properties to spread from a tuple in the Uk-graph to its “neigh-
bouring” tuples (contagious), force the inclusion of certain tuples when some
other tuples are present (implicative), and force atleast some tuples to exist so
we forbid the empty relation on any induced Uk-subgraph (disjunctive). To make
stating the results of this section easy, we will denote by P [S+, S−] the collection
of all relations satisfying property P , containing all tuples in S+ and none in S−
for some disjoint S+, S− ⊆ V k.
Definition 7. Let a¯, b¯ ∈ V k. A Uk-graph property P is called a¯/b¯ contagious if
there exist two disjoint sets S+, S− ⊆ V k such that:
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1. For every R ∈ P [S+, S−], a¯ ∈ R implies b¯ ∈ R.
2. There exist R0, R1 ∈ P [S
+, S−] with a¯ ∈ R1 and b¯ /∈ R0.
Definition 8. A property P is called contagious if it satisfies either of the
conditions below:
1. For some j, P is a¯/c¯ contagious for all distinct elements a1, ..., ak, b ∈ V for
all c¯ ∈ (a1, ..., aj−1, b, ..., ak)
+j
δ .
2. P is a¯/c¯ contagious for all distinct elements a1, ..., ak, b ∈ V for all j where
c¯ = a¯−j , b.
Definition 9. A property P is called implicative if there exist two disjoint sets
S+, S− ⊆ V k and three pairwise distinct tuples a¯1, a¯2, a¯3 ∈ V k\(S+ ∪ S−) such
that:
1. For every relation R ∈ P [S+, S−], a¯1, a¯2 ∈ R implies a¯3 ∈ R.
2. There exist Uk-graphs R0, R1, R2, R13, R123 ∈ P [S+, S−] which satisfy
R0 ∩ {a¯1, a¯2, a¯3} = φ, R1 ∩ {a¯1, a¯2, a¯3} = {a¯1}, R2 ∩ {a¯1, a¯2, a¯3} = {a¯2},
R13 ∩ {a¯1, a¯2, a¯3} = {a¯1, a¯3}, and R123 ∩ {a¯1, a¯2, a¯3} = {a¯1, a¯2, a¯3}.
Definition 10. A Uk-graph property P is called disjunctive if there exist two
disjoint sets S+, S− ⊆ V k and two pairwise distinct tuples a¯1, a¯2 ∈ V k\(S+∪S−)
such that:
1. For every relation R ∈ P [S+, S−], a¯1 ∈ R or a¯2 ∈ R.
2. There exist relations R1, R2 ∈ P [S+, S−] with R1 ∩ {a¯1, a¯2} = {a¯1} and
R2 ∩ {a¯1, a¯2} = {a¯2}.
Before using the metaproperties defined to prove the required results, it
is important to justify the choice of definition by verifying if they are sat-
isfied by the properties used to complete the proof earlier. For example, to
see that simplicial transitivity is contagious and implicative, we can choose
S+ = (a1, ..., aj , b, ..., ak)
+j,+(j+1)
δ , S
− = φ, and
S+ = (a1, ..., aj , b, ..., ak)
+j,+(j+1)
δ \{(a2, ..., aj, b, ..., ak)}, S
− = φ respectively.
In a similar spirit, to see that connectedness is disjunctive, choose S+ = {a¯τ |
τ 6= τ1, τ2} for some distinct permutations τ1, τ2 and S− = φ.
3.2 Impossibility results
For a tuple a¯, consider the set Wa¯ such that a¯ ∈ F (R)↔ NRa¯ ∈ Wa¯. Thus, Wa¯
is the collection of winning coalitions for the tuple a¯. An important property
of elections is symmetry with respect to candidates. This would require that
a coalition that could ensure the inclusion of one tuple is also able to ensure
inclusion of all the other tuples or Wa¯ =W for all tuples a¯ and some collection
of coalitionsW . We will only consider neutrality over the tuples with all distinct
elements.
Now we are ready to prove k-ary analogues of some of the important results
of [4].
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Lemma 1. (Neutrality lemma)(cf. [4, Lemma 12]) For |V | ≥ k+1, any unani-
mous, grounded, and IIE aggregation rule that is collectively rational with respect
to a contagious property must be neutral as defined above.
Proof. Consider first a property P that is a¯/b¯ contagious for a¯, b¯ ∈ V k. Consider
an aggregation rule F that is unanimous, grounded, IIE, and collectively rational
with respect to P . We will show that Wa¯ ⊆ Wb¯. Let C be a coalition in Wa¯ and
S+, S− ⊆ V k, R0, R1 ∈ P [S+, S−] be appropriate constructions from the a¯/b¯
contagiousness of P . Consider a profileR where individuals in C propose R1 and
others propose R0. Since C was a winning coalition for tuple a¯, a¯ ∈ F (R). Also,
S+ ⊆ F (R) and S−∩F (R) = φ by unanimity and groundedness respectively. By
collective rationality, F (R) ∈ P [S+, S−] and thus b¯ ∈ F (R). Since only voters
in C supported b¯, C ∈ Wb¯.
We know that all Wa¯’s are nonempty (since N ∈ Wa¯ for each a¯). Consider
arbitrary pairwise distinct a¯, b¯ ∈ V k. We will prove that Wa¯ ⊆ Wb¯, which is
sufficient to prove the claim. Notice the similarity to Proposition 2. Consider
C ∈ Wa¯.
– If P is contagious by condition 1, we can use
a¯/[a2, ..., aj , b1, ..., ak]-contagiousness to get C ∈ W[a2,...,aj,b1,...,ak], followed
by [a2, ..., aj , b1, ..., ak]/[a3, ..., aj , b1, b2, ..., ak]-contagiousness
for C ∈ W[a3,...,aj,b1,b2,...,ak], and so on till you get C ∈ W[b1,...,bj,aj+1,...,ak].
Following that, apply contagiousness in a similar fashion but choose compo-
nents of b¯ in reverse (bk followed by bk−1 and so on) while replacing. After
k steps, we can conclude C ∈ Wb¯.
– If P is contagious by condition 2, we can use a¯/[b1, a2, ..., ak]-contagiousness
to get C ∈ Wa¯−1,b. Similarly, use the definition of contagiousness for values
of j increasing by 1 till you conclude C ∈ Wb¯.
This completes the proof.
Below is the filter-version of the main result.
Theorem 2. (cf. [4, Theorem 15]) (Oligarchy Theorem) For |V | ≥ k + 1, any
unanimous, grounded, and IIE aggregation rule for k-ary relations that is col-
lectively rational with respect to a contagious and implicative property must be
oligarchic on pairwise distinct tuples.
Proof. Take any property P which is contagious and implicative, along with an
aggregation rule F that is unanimous, grounded, IIE, and collectively rational
with respect to P . As shown in the lemma above, we can now talk about a com-
mon collection of winning coalitionsW such that a¯ ∈ F (R)↔ NRa¯ ∈ W for any
pairwise distinct tuple a¯. We will show that W is a filter, equivalent to claiming
that F is an oligarchic rule, with the oligarchy serving as the least element in
the filter.
Clearly, by unanimity N ∈ W .
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To showW is closed under intersections, consider arbitrary C1, C2 ∈ W . Con-
sider a profile R where individuals in C1∩C2 propose R123, those in C1\C2 pro-
pose R1, those in C2\C1 propose R2, and others propose R0 where the Uk-graphs
are the ones from the definition of an implicative property. Since C1, C2 are win-
ning coalitions, a¯1, a¯2 ∈ F (R). Also, S+ ⊆ F (R) and S−∩F (R) = φ by unanim-
ity and groundedness respectively. By collective rationality, F (R) ∈ P [S+, S−]
and thus a¯3 ∈ F (R). Since only voters in C1 ∩C2 supported a¯3, C1 ∩ C2 ∈ W .
To show W is closed under upper bounds, consider arbitrary C1 ∈ W and
C1 ⊆ C2. Consider a profile R where individuals in C1 propose R123, those
in C2\C1 propose R13, and others propose R1 where the Uk-graphs are the ones
from the definition of an implicative property. Since C1 is a winning coalitions,
a¯2 ∈ F (R). Also, a¯1 ∈ F (R), S+ ⊆ F (R), and S− ∩ F (R) = φ by unanimity
and groundedness respectively. By collective rationality, F (R) ∈ P [S+, S−] and
thus a¯3 ∈ F (R). Since only voters in C2 supported a¯3, C2 ∈ W .
Thus, we have successfully shown that W is a filter under the given assump-
tions.
Theorem 3. (cf. [4, Theorem 16]) (Dictatorship Theorem) For |V | ≥ k + 1,
any unanimous, grounded, and IIE aggregation rule for k-ary relations that is
collectively rational with respect to a contagious, implicative, and disjunctive
property must be dictatorial on pairwise distinct tuples.
Proof. Take any property P which is contagious, implicative, and disjunctive,
along with an aggregation rule F that is unanimous, grounded, IIE, and collec-
tively rational with respect to P . As shown in the above theorem, we can now
talk about a common collection of winning coalitions W such that a¯ ∈ F (R)↔
NRa¯ ∈ W for any pairwise distinct a¯ which is a filter. We will now show that
it is an ultrafilter, equivalent to claiming that F is a dictatorial rule, with the
dictator serving as the least element in the ultrafilter.
Consider arbitrary coalition C. Consider a profile R where individuals in C pro-
pose R1, and others propose R2 where the Uk-graphs are the ones from the def-
inition of a disjunctive property. It follows that S+ ⊆ F (R) and S− ∩F (R) = φ
by unanimity and groundedness respectively. By collective rationality, F (R) ∈
P [S+, S−] and thus a¯1 ∈ F (R) or a¯2 ∈ F (R). Since only voters in C supported
a¯1 and only those in N\C supported a¯2, C ∈ W or N\C ∈ W . Thus, W is an
ultrafilter.
Thus, we have successfully extended the idea to k-ary relations.
4 Discussion and future work
4.1 Some immediate consequences
We have already seen that for social choice situations where our language carries
a single relation symbol, the collection of winning coalitions forms an ultrafilter.
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Now, consider a language with many relation symbols {Ri}i∈I . For each Ri, an
argument similar to above would state that its interpretation is decided by an
ultrafilter. Thus, the coalitions that decide all relations of the aggregate form an
intersection of ultrafilters which is a filter.
4.2 Future work
Model-theoretic structures In model theory, one often thinks of a filtered
product of a collection of first-order structures, for a fixed language, as their
average/aggregate. So far we have only dealt with a special class of relational
structures. It will be very interesting to see whether it is possible to find some
sufficient conditions that the interpretations of function symbols satisfy in order
to force the aggregation to be a filtered product of those structures.
Simplicial complexes A lot of applications model relationships as simpli-
cial complexes with bounded dimension. Apart from aggregating social relation-
ships, simplicial complexes are also useful in diverse areas including rendering
3D-graphics. Such aggregation problems could arise naturally in decentralized
computing setups when each unit produces a simplicial complex built on a pre-
determined grid of points.
References
1. Arrow, K.J.: Social choice and individual values. 2nd edn. Yale University Press
(1963)
2. Fishburn, P.C., Rubinstein, A: Aggregation of equivalence relations. Journal of Clas-
sification 3(1), 61–65 (1986)
3. Pini, M.S., Rossi, F., Venable, K.B. and Walsh, T.: Aggregating partially ordered
preferences 19(3), 475–502 (2008)
4. Endriss, U., Grandi, U.: Graph aggregation. Artificial Intelligence 245, 86–114
(2017)
5. Abramsky, S.: Arrow’s Theorem by Arrow Theory. In Logic Without Borders: Essays
on Set Theory, Model Theory, Philosophical Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics
by A. Hirvonen, J. Kontinen, R. Kossak, & A. Villaveces (Eds.), De Gruyter. 15–30
(2015)
